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CORPORATE FINANCE




This Essay proposes introducing the option perspective in the
teaching of corporate law. Stock options arise naturally in such
corporate law cases as United States v. O'Hagan.1 But there are
several benefits from considering them early in a corporate law
course and more thoroughly and systematically than merely in
passing, during a discussion of the misappropriation theory of
insider trading. These benefits are fivefold. First, defining stock
options right after defining stocks helps to emphasize the differ-
ences between the capital appreciation or depreciation aspect of
stock ownership and other aspects of stock ownership, such as
receiving dividends and having voting rights. In other words, both
stockholders and holders of stock options experience financial gains
or losses depending on the performance of the stock in question.
But, while stockholders enjoy corporate voting rights and dividend
payments, holders of stock options do not. It is useful to remind
students that if all that an individual cares about is the potential
capital appreciation of the shares of a publicly traded corporation,
* Assistant Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School. Thanks to Chuck
O'Kelley for his invitation to participate in this Conference; Joseph A. Grundfest for the
GumbyTM options and options origami pedagogical innovations from his capital markets and
securities regulation course at Stanford; Paul Mahoney, Frank Partnoy, and audience
members for general discussions about options. Special thanks to Don M. Chance, Michael
S. Knoll, Kimberly D. Krawiec, and Hillary A. Sale for written comments and suggestions.
Finally, thanks to Bill Draper at the Biddle Law Library of the University of Pennsylvania
Law School for help in locating sources and assembling research.
521 U.S. 642 (1997).
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there are cheaper ways to participate in that upside potential than
buying shares of that corporation. Such an observation is especially
timely in this age of Internet startups and various fill-in-the-
blank.com initial public offerings. Distinguishing holding shares of
stock from holding stock options also leads to discussing a market
for corporate voting rights. That discussion raises naturally the
questions of whether and why corporate vote selling is or should be
illegal. Second, displaying stock option payoffs graphically in terms
of "hockey stick" figures leads naturally into a discussion of the zero-
sum nature of trading in options, financial engineering via the
vertical addition of such graphs, and put-call parity.2 Third, viewing
transactions in corporate equities and debt as being functionally
equivalent to trading in options---"the option perspective"-illus-
trates the conflict of incentives between shareholders and bondhold-
ers of a corporation by reinterpreting equity and debt as options on
corporate assets. Fourth, this option perspective demonstrates that
paying managers in stock and/or stock options can reduce the
conflict of interests between managers and shareholders because
such incentive compensation increases managers' willingness to
undertake risky projects. Fifth, introducing the notion of real
options permits a contrast between traditional expected values of
corporate projects or mergers versus their real option values.
The value of the option perspective in corporate finance education
is acknowledged to such a degree that the leading first-year MBA
corporate finance texts devote several chapters to options.3 A
financial option contract provides its owner with the opportunity,
but not the obligation, to buy or sell some other underlying financial
instrument, such as a bond, stock, index, or specified amount of
foreign currency at a pre-specified currency exchange rate. The
study of valuing or pricing stock options dates back to Bachelier's
2 "Hockey stick" figures, so named for the distinctive shape of their curves, are standard
terminology in the options literature. See, e.g., HERSH SHERFIN, BEYOND GREED AND FEAR:
UNDERSTANDING BEHAVIORAL FINANCE AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INVESTING 273 (2000)
(employing "hockey stick" charts).
3 E.g., RICHARD A. BREALY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE
581-666(6th ed. 2000); STEPHENA. ROSS ETAL., CORPORATE FINANCE 546-619 (5th ed. 1999).
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path-breaking dissertation in 1900.' The 1997 Nobel Prize in
Economics recognized the seminal financial option pricing models of
Fisher Black, Robert Merton, and Myron Scholes.' Financial options
permit decisionmakers to hedge financial risks such as those due to
fluctuations in stock prices, interest rates, or currency rates.6
Financial options revolutionized modern capital markets by allowing
participants to reallocate financial risk.' Of course, capital market
participants can also use financial options to speculate over the
likely future course of underlying financial prices. Recent well-
publicized huge losses by many parties, including the hedge fund
Long-Term Capital Management, from utilizing financial options
have led to repeated calls for increased regulation of currency and
stock index options. Clearly, financial options are here to stay and
will grow in importance. Therefore, an essential part of any
manager's education should be an understanding of the role that
financial options can play in corporate financing.
While many law students take a course in corporate finance,
many others do not. This Essay suggests that the basic course in
Corporations is a natural time and place to introduce the option
perspective to law students.' While such an introduction might
arouse their appetite for taking Corporate Finance, more impor-
tantly the option perspective is too crucial a way of thinking to be
restricted just to law students who take Corporate Finance and/or
SLouis Bachelier, Theorie de la Speculation [Theory of Speculation], 17 ANNALS DE
L'ECOLE NORMALE SUPERIEURE 21-86 (1900), translated in THE RANDOM CHARACTER OF
STOCK MARKET PRICES 17 (Paul Cootner ed., A. James Boness trans., 1964).
' Fisher Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J.
POL. ECON. 637 (1973); Robert C. Merton, Theory of Rational Option Pricing, 4 BELLJ. ECON.
& MGMT. SCI. 141 (1973). For a press release from the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences
describing the contributions underlying the 1997 Nobel Prize in Economics, see Royal
Swedish Academy of Sciences, Information (visited Jan. 13, 2000) <http://www.nobel.se/
announcement-97/economy97.html>.
6 See, e.g., CHARLES W. SMITHSON ET AL., MANAGING FINANCIAL RISK: A GUIDE TO
DERIVATIVE PRODUCTS, FINANCIAL ENGINEERING, AND VALUE MAXIMIZATION 62-63 (1995)
(explaining how derivatives hedge against unwanted risk).
' Stephen A. Ross, Options and Efficiency, 90 Q.J. ECON. 75 (1976) (proving that
sufficiently many option markets result in Pareto-efficient allocation of risk). But see Peter
H. Huang, A Normative Analysis of New Financially Engineered Derivatives. 73 S. CAL. L.
REV. 471, 500-02 (2000) (explaining that not enough derivatives typically results in inefficient
allocations of risk).
' See generally Frank Partnoy, AddingDerivatives to the Corporate Law Mix, 34 GA. L.
REV. 599 (2000) (expressing related and similar viewpoint).
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Securities Regulation. In addition, Corporate Finance courses and
textbooks focus their options coverage on how to utilize quantitative
option pricing formulae, as provided by the Black-Scholes and
binomial option pricing models.' What is being suggested here is to
cover in the basic corporate law course only the qualitative aspects
of the option perspective.
Two of the leading scholars in corporate law observe that "[m]any
common securities and business relationships can be characterized
as options. Understanding what factors determine the value of an
option can highlight the incentives of the parties to an acquisition
or other business transaction."" They also point out how "many
common relationships can be recharacterized as involving the grant
and receipt of an option."1 In fact, the popular Gilson and Black
paperback on finance and investment includes a chapter entitled
"The Option Perspective."'2 That chapter is taken from the authors'
casebook on corporate acquisitions and transaction planning. 3 This
Essay merely suggests introducing the option perspective into legal
education earlier than in advanced business law courses, such as
Corporate Finance, Corporate Acquisitions, or Securities Regulation.
There are two advantages to introducing the option perspective in
the basic course on Business Associations or Corporations. First, an
early introduction provides an important unifying theme for those
law students who later take advanced corporate law courses,
helping them realize interconnections between those courses. A
second advantage is that many law students who take Corporations
do not enroll in advanced corporate law courses. Every law student
can profit from appreciating that many legal (and non-legal)
decisions involve real options. The option perspective offers
important and fundamental insights to many areas of law besides
the corporate area.
' Black & Scholes, supra note 5; see John C. Cox et al., Option Pricing: A Simplified
Approach, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 229 (1979) (presenting simple discrete-time model for valuing
options).
1 RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, (SOME OF) THE ESSENTIALS OF FINANCE AND
INvESTENT 1 (1993).
" Id. at 245.
12 Id. at 231-53.
13 RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAw AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE
ACQUISITIONS 231-52 (2d ed. 1995).
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This Essay is organized as follows. The first Part considers the
logistical details of introducing financial options to law students. It
suggests primary and secondary reading materials that are suitable
for law students. The main reading material is the above-mentioned
chapter from the paperback by Ronald Gilson and Bernard Black. 4
The Essay also offers some pedagogical devices that help ease the
introduction of the option perspective to law students. Finally, it
discusses optional additional topics and extensions. Part II
considers the logistical details of introducing real options to law
students. It suggests primary and secondary reading materials that
are drawn from the management literature but are also appropriate
for law students. It also suggests a series of motivating real options
that should be familiar to law students. Finally, it discusses
optional additional topics and extensions.
I. FiNANCIAL OPTIONS AND CORPORATE LAW
Chapter Seven of the Ronald Gilson and Bernard Black paper-
back on finance and investment15 is a readable and short introduc-
tion to the option perspective that is very accessible to law students.
The chapter is only twenty pages long, but in that space the authors
accomplish quite a lot. They demonstrate the usefulness of the
option perspective for transaction planning. 6 They define the basic
terminology of call and put stock options.1 They display graphs of
the gross payoffs for option holders. 8 They explain how trading in
options can function as a substitute for and a complement to trading
in stocks. 9 They describe how options can be thought of as
providing insurance policies against declines in the underlying stock
price and in doing so demonstrate the put-call parity result.2" They
cover the fundamental factors that determine a call option's value.2'
14 GILSON & BLcK, supra note 10.
15 Id.
,6 Id. at 231.
17 Id. at 232-34, 237-38.
18 Id. at 232-33 (Figures 7-1 & 7-2).
19 Id. at 234-35.
20 Id. at 236-37.
21 Id. at 238-44.
20001 575
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Their exposition of how the variance of the underlying stock affects
call option value is very lucid, particularly their discussion of the
impacts of holding expected return constant and increasing
unsystematic risk versus holding expected return constant and
increasing systematic risk on call option value.22 They apply the
option perspective to illuminate the conflict between shareholders
and bondholders by providing a simple numerical example.23 They
also include an excerpt from Delaware Chancellor William Allen's
opinion in the case of Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v.
Pathe Communications Corp.4 This passage contains a hypothetical
numerical example that explicitly uses the option perspective to
determine the fiduciary duties of directors of a corporation at or
near insolvency.25 The authors go on to explain the subsequent
holding that directors owe fiduciary duties to creditors once a
corporation becomes insolvent regardless of whether that corpora-
tion has filed for bankruptcy.26 But, as they point out, that case
does not resolve the overall tension between maximizing share-
holder value and maximizing the value of an entire corporation
when that corporation is solvent.2 Finally, they apply the option
perspective to explain that paying managers with stock and/or stock
options, or leveraging a corporation through a leveraged buyout,
reduces the conflict of interests between shareholders and managers
by increasing managers' willingness to undertake risky corporate
projects.
28
There are several differences between owning a stock and owning
a call option written on that stock. From a practical viewpoint, a
stock option premium is usually a mere fraction of the value of the
amount of stock that option potentially controls. This fact explains
why stock options are highly leveraged financial instruments. From
a legal perspective, a stockholder is entitled to any financial gains
or losses from selling the stock in the future, to any periodic
'" Id. at 240-43 (Figures 7-3 & 7-4).
23 Id. at 245-46 (Table 7-1).
24 1991 WL 277613, at *34, n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
2 GILSON & BLACK, supra note 10, at 249-50.
' Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co., 621 A.2d 784, 781-88 (Del. 1992).




dividend payments, and to vote at annual shareholder meetings or
special meetings. In contrast, a stock option holder is entitled only
to any financial gains or losses from exercising or selling the stock
option in the future. The stock option holder is not entitled to
receive any periodic dividend payments, nor to exercise voting rights
at shareholder meetings. Students can often appreciate these
differences further by considering the following hypothetical
example of how to circumvent legal prohibitions against the sale of
corporate voting rights.29
Although New York corporate law prohibits explicitly selling
corporate voting rights, stockholders can in principle overcome that
legal prohibition by entering into clever and circuitous investment
portfolios.30 For example, "an option strategy known as the
conversion arbitrage, in which the investor holds the stock and a put
and a call (with the same expiration date and exercise price as the
put), essentially leaves the investor holding only the vote and not
the cash claim.""' Corporate voting rights are usually not why a
shareholder buys the stock of that corporation. Instead, most
shareholders are typically motivated by the right to receive
dividends and capital gains. But corporate voting rights can become
quite important and valuable when that corporation is facing a
contest for the control of its assets. A stylized game-theoretic model
of hostile takeover attempts proves that "more value- and welfare-
increasing takeovers will occur if vote trading is allowed."32 In
reality, such conversion arbitrage might be of limited utility because
of transaction costs and the restricted terms of exchange-listed
options.33
' See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 395,410-11 (1983) (providing early analysis of legal prohibitions against corporate vote
trading).
3 See N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 609(e) (Consol. 1983) CA shareholder shall not sell his vote
or issue a proxy to vote to any person for any sum of money or anything of value.").
' Douglas H. Blair et al., Unbundling the Voting Rights and Profit Claims of Common





Another way investors can trade corporate voting rights is by
engaging in the following swap transaction.34 Suppose that Chris
owned ten percent of a corporation's stock and would like to sell the
corporate voting rights accompanying those shares to Pat. Chris can
accomplish this by entering into a contract in which Pat buys the
actual shares from Chris at current market value. Pat thus
acquires the financial consequences (dividend payments as well as
capital gains or losses) and the associated corporate voting rights of
being a stockholder. As part of the contract's terms, Pat promises
to pay Chris all of the dividends paid by the corporation on those
shares until such time as they agree Pat will sell back those shares
to Chris for the same price that Pat originally paid. In addition, Pat
makes an up-front payment to Chris of some amount, such as an
absolute dollar figure or a percentage of the value of the amount of
stocks in question, with the percentage being set, for example, at the
prevailing London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR). The net effect
of this contractual transaction is that Chris is able to sell Pat
corporate voting rights for some mutually agreed price.
Such a deal splits up stock ownership rights into corporate voting
rights and financial rights, and then swaps those corporate voting
rights for cash. The feasibility of such a swap certainly depends on
the assumption that both counter-parties perform as contractually
obligated. Of course, if courts view such private contractual
arrangements as being against public policy, those obligations might
not be legally enforceable. 5 Presumably, the counter-parties to such
a swap would have to disclose it, at least if they were doing it as
part of a control contest." If we do not observe these kinds of swaps
' This example is from Joseph A. Grundfeses lectures in his Capital Markets and
Securities Regulation course at Stanford.
' The Delaware courts traditionally condemned vote buyingper se, but recently adopted
a more textured view. A series of cases that started with Schreiber v. Carney, 447 A.2d 17
(Del. Ch. 1982), recognized that vote buying could be in the interests of shareholders. The
focus in this evolving Delaware jurisprudence is whether "the object or purpose is to defraud
or in some way disenfranchise the other stockholders." Id. at 25-26. Instead of prohibiting
vote trading categorically, the Court of Chancery sees vote trading as "a voidable transaction
subject to a test for intrinsic fairness." Id. at 26.
' Thanks to Ed Rock for this point and the following observation. See Edward B. Rock,
Encountering the Scarlet Woman of Wall Streetk Speculative Comments at the End of the
Century, 3 THEORETICALINQUIRIES L. (forthcoming 2000), for an interesting discussion of the
market for proxies in the battles for control over the Erie Railroad between Jay Gould and
578 [Vol. 34:571
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in reality, then perhaps the desire to buy corporate votes does not
exist, people are unaware they can do this, or the above-stated
equivalence is overstated. As with the previously discussed
conversion arbitrage option strategy, high transaction costs may
curtail the use of corporate voting swaps.3 7 Another possibility is
that people would like to engage in corporate vote trading and are
aware of the possibility of doing so in this manner, but are reluctant
to engage in contracts that may be unenforceable or illegal.8
Finally, and most likely, there is the possibility that the lack of
observable vote-buying transactions is due to the parties' deliberate
secrecy because such transactions are of questionable legality and
enforceability. 9 Whether or not such a corporate voting swap is
observed in practice, or is even legally enforceable, raises interesting
conceptual questions. The point of the hypothetical, however, is to
reinforce the difference between owning a stock and owning a stock
option, because a stockholder could theoretically enter into the
above swap while a stock option holder could not.
Several pedagogical devices-which I offer here in the form of
charts and illustrations-help ease the introduction of the option
perspective into the basic corporate law course. A source of
PowerPoint slides about options can be found in a unique, state-of-
the-art multimedia introductory text on derivatives.4 In addition
to the basic and familiar graphs of the gross payoffs for call and put
option holders, students find three additional illustrations helpful
in understanding options. These are graphs illustrating: the net
payoffs for call and put option holders; the gross payoffs for call and
put option sellers; and the net payoffs for call and put option sellers.
The first and third pairs of graphs involve simply a parallel vertical
shifting of the graphs of the respective gross payoffs by the amount
Cornelius Vanderbilt.
Blair et al., supra note 31.
u Thanks to Kim Krawiec for suggesting this possibility. See PRESIDENT'S WORKING
GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, OVER-THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVES MARKETS AND THE
COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT (1999), available at <http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/
ps224.htm> (visited Apr. 20, 2000) (recommending changes to Commodity Exchange Act to
promote innovation in over-the-counter derivative markets by removing the risk and
uncertainty over the legality or enforceability of such contracts).
' Once again, thanks to Kim Krawiec for suggesting this last possibility.
40 MARK RUBINSTEIN, DERIVATIVES: A POWERPLUS PICTURE BOOK (1999).
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of the option premium. The second pair of graphs drives home to
students that option payoffs must be zero-sum between the option
buyer or holder and option seller or writer. Students also find it
useful to learn the commonplace terminology of being "long" for
buying some financial instrument and being "short" for selling that
instrument.
Students find it helpful to manipulate the above option value or
payoff graphs actively instead ofjust passively observing them. One
way to accomplish this is to hand students a sheet of paper contain-
ing four graphs as depicted in Figure 1. The net payoff to a call
option buyer is depicted in the top left corner. The net payoff to a
call option seller is depicted in the bottom left corner. The net
payoff to a put option buyer is depicted in the top right corner. The
net payoff to a put option seller is depicted in the bottom right
corner. The sheet of paper should contain two dotted lines, one
horizontal and the other vertical, dividing the sheet into four
quadrants containing the respective graphs. If students fold the
sheet first along the horizontal dotted line they can observe how the
net payoffs to an option buyer and to an option seller are reflections
across that horizontal dotted line, or mirror images of each other.
The zero-sum nature of these payoffs is visually illustrated by their
canceling out upon vertical addition. If students then fold that sheet
along the vertical dotted line they can observe how the net payoffs
to a put option buyer (or seller) and to a call option buyer (or seller)
are, similarly, mirror images of each other.
Figure 1: Option Origami for
Net Option Payoff Diagrams
Long Call Long Put
............ .............. °.......°°°. , . ... ................ o  ..°° ° .°.°° .........
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Another way of illustrating the zero-sum nature of the payoffs for
long and short positions is for the instructor to use a transparency
for the long position and to flip that same transparency over to show
the short position. These graphs become more student-friendly
upon bringing a toy GumbyTM figure to class and bending its arms
into the various option payoff shapes. An alternative is to project in-
class from a laptop with an Internet connection or download and
print out pictures (available from various sites) of GumbyTM figures
with their arms bent in the various option payoff shapes.4 An
example is provided in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Options Gumby
Long Call Long Put
Short Put Short Call
Students become more comfortable with the four basic option
payoff diagrams by learning to combine these figures with each
other. The payoff diagram for any portfolio formed by a combination
of stock options is found by vertically adding their individual payoff
diagrams. The addition is done vertically because all of the payoff
diagrams have as their horizontal axis the underlying stock price or
value. Students can determine for themselves, by vertically adding
the respective payoff diagrams, that buying a straddle (one call and
"' Eg., Official Gumbyworld Home Page (visited Mar. 3, 2000) <http://www.
gumbyword.com/>; The Official Gumby Web Site (visited Apr. 20, 2000) <http://www.




one put on the same underlying stock with a common strike price)
is effectively betting on high volatility. This process is depicted in
Figures 3-6. Similarly, selling a straddle (selling one call and one
put on the same underlying stock with a common strike price) is
effectively betting on the lack of volatility. This process is depicted
in Figures 7-10.
Figure 3: Long Call
Long Call: A Strategy for Profiting







Figure 5: Buying A Straddle
Long Call & Long Put




Figure 6: Finished Product:
A Long Straddle
A Strategy for Profiting from High Volatility
Long Straddle
Net Payoff
Figure 7: Short Call
Option Value (gross to seller)
m m n M .* SharPrice
Figure 8: Short Put
Option Value (gross to seller)
Share Price
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Figure 9: Selling a Straddle




Figure 10: Finished Product:
A Short Straddle





Students can play with more involved option portfolio strategies,
such as butterfly spreads (buying a call option with a low strike
price, buying another call option with a high strike price, and selling
two call options with an intermediate strike price).42 Once students
realize that the payoff diagram for a stock plotted against itself
results in a 45-degree line (as depicted in Figure 11), they can add
that figure into their collection of diagrams. Students can then
engage in such financial engineering as constructing a protective
put by buying a stock and buying a put option for that stock. This
process is depicted in Figures 11-14. Once students realize that the
payoff diagram for a riskless bond plotted against stock value is just
a horizontal line (as depicted in Figure 15), they can add that figure
to their collection of diagrams. By comparing the payoff diagram of
a protective put with the payoff diagram resulting from the strategy
of buying a call and investing the present value of the strike price
of that put in a riskless bond, students can see for themselves why
the put-call parity relationship holds. This process is depicted in
Figures 16-19.
Figure 11: Long Stock Figure 12: Adding
a Long Put
Long Stock & Long Put





'2 See, e.g., ROBERT W. KOLB, FINANCIALDERIVATWES 170-73 (1993) (illustrating reason
for name "butterfly spread").
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Product: A Protective Put
• Protective Put
Share Price
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Figure 16: Long Call
Long Call: A Strategy for Profiting
from High Upside Volatility
*Long call
Share Price
Figure 17: Buy Call & Invest
Present Value of Strike
Price in a Riskless Bond


















Students can easily see that equity is a call option written on the
value of total corporate assets with a date of expiration being the
maturity of debt, a strike price equal to the value of bondholders'
(and any creditors') claims, and a premium equal to the current
stock price. This equivalence is depicted in Figure 20. This
fundamental observation implies conflicts of interests between
stockholders versus bondholders and creditors. The latter groups do
not participate in any upside potential for the stock price and stand
to lose their principal upon bankruptcy. If a corporation has no
creditors besides its bondholders, the value of total corporate assets
equals debt plus equity. In that case, students can also easily see
that debt equals the value of total corporate assets minus equity. In
other words, bondholders effectively purchased that corporation and
sold to stockholders a call option written on corporate assets with an
expiration date equal to the maturity of the corporate bonds, a
strike price equal to the face value of corporate debt, and a premium
equal to the current bond price. This equivalence is depicted in
Figure 21. This fundamental observation implies that holding
everything else constant, corporate debt value decreases with
increased volatility in the value of total corporate assets. It also
588 [Vol. 34:571
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explains why bondholders typically insist on covenants that limit
management's ability to increase the volatility of total corporate
assets. Students usually find it a bit harder to see that owning
corporate debt is equivalent to buying a riskless bond having as its
payoff the promised payment to bondholders, and selling to
stockholders a put option with a strike price equal to the payment
to bondholders. The put option written on total corporate assets
that stockholders own is an option to default on their corporate bond
payments.
Figure 20: Common
Stock as a Long Call
Strike Price = Face Value of Debt
/
Face Valueof Debt Corporate Aset Value




Strike price = Face Value of Debt
20001 589
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Of course, the option perspective to corporate securities extends
beyond simple debt and equity. If a corporation issues only three
securities-common stock, senior debt, and junior debt-then the
value of total corporate assets equals the face value of senior debt
plus debt, plus the face value of junior debt, plus equity. In that
case, students can also easily see that stockholders own a call option
written on the value of total corporate assets with a strike price
equal to the total value of senior and junior debt. Students also can
visualize the respective payoffs to senior and junior debt. These
payoffs are depicted in Figure 22. Students usually find it a bit
harder to see that owning corporate junior debt is equivalent to
buying a portfolio of call options written on the value of total
corporate assets. This equivalence is depicted in Figure 23. This
portfolio consists of buying a call option with a strike price equal to
the promised payment to senior bondholders and selling to
stockholders a call option with a strike price equal to the total value
of junior and senior debt. This fundamental observation explains
why junior bondholders typically insist on covenants that not only
limit management's ability to increase the volatility of total
corporate assets, but also prohibit or restrict management from
issuing additional senior classes of debt.
Figure 22: Senior &
Junior Debt Payoffs
GSenior Debt Payoff





Figure 23: Junior Debt as a
Portfolio of Call Options
Junior Debt = Long Call with strike price FVS +
Short Call with strike price FVS + FVJ
FVS
Corporate Asset Value
The observation that stock is effectively a call option written on
corporate value also has implications for how shareholders should
structure managerial incentive compensation to better align
incentives between managers and shareholders. As Kimberly
Krawiec emphasizes in her contribution to this symposium, a crucial
if not defining theme of the basic business associations course is "the
interaction among the various groups that form the business
enterprise."'43 In particular, managers control the day-to-day
corporate decisions that most shareholders have no ability, time, or
inclination to observe directly or monitor indirectly. A particular
difficulty is that managers typically engage in corporate transac-
tions with less risk than well-diversified stockholders would prefer.
This occurs even if managers and shareholders have the same
degree of risk aversion because managers usually have both their
financial capital and human capital tied up in the corporation they
manage. When managers undertake low-risk corporate projects,
engage in mergers, diversify corporate assets, or buy insurance, they
are simply adjusting their concentrated portfolios to a level of risk
' Kimberly D. Krawiec, Building the Basic Course Around Intra.firm Relations, 34 GA.
L. REV. 785, 785 (2000).
2000]
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
that is consistent with their level of risk aversion. It is likely that
managers are in fact no more risk averse (and might even be less
risk averse because they are wealthier) than shareholders on
average. But, because managers own such concentrated portfolios
of human capital and financial assets, they will accept low-risk
corporate transactions to bring their portfolio risks to more
acceptable levels. One way to induce managers to undertake riskier
corporate projects is to pay them in stock and/or stock options.
Corporations that have more growth options do and should offer
more stock options to their CEOs." In fact, recent theoretical work
has generated three more specific predictions.45 First, corporations
with more growth opportunities will offer more corporate stock
options to non-executive employees. Second, corporations granting
larger amounts of stock options to top executives will also grant
more stock options deeper in the corporation to non-executive
employees. Third, the stock option component in a CEO's compensa-
tion package should increase as the importance of that CEO's role
in evaluating and selecting projects increases relative to managing
assets-in-place duties.
Shareholders can also leverage a corporation by undertaking a
leveraged buyout (LBO). Doing an LBO simultaneously attenuates
the call option-like features of that corporation's stock and frees up
equity so that the remaining stockholders can grant managers a
greater equity stake in that corporation. This observation means
that, other things being equal, corporations that have more growth
opportunities or options have greater payoffs from and thus
incentives to undergo an LBO. These corporate growth options are
specific examples of the more general category of real options that
include waiting-to-invest, flexibility, learning, scaling, timing, and
exit options.
" See, e.g., Clifford W. Smith & Rene M. Stulz, The Determinants of Firms'Hedging
Policies, 20 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANAL. 391 (1985) (examining taxes, contracting costs, and other
factors as possible explanations of firms' hedging practices); Clifford W. Smith & Ross L.
Watts, The Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate Financing, Dividend, and Compensa-
tion Policies, 32 J. FIN. ECON. 263 (1992) (suggesting contract theory is more important in
explaining cross-sectional variation than tax-based or signaling theories).
' John Core & Jun Qian, Option-like Contracts for Innovation and Production 3 (1999)
(unpublished manuscript presented in the Applied Microeconomic Theory workshop at the
University of Pennsylvania Economics Department).
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II. REAL OPTIONS AND (CORPORATE) LAW
Management specialists have studied real options for over a
quarter of a century. Real options involve decisions regarding real
activities or real commodities whose risk has not been reduced to
financial instruments. Examples of real options include options to
expand preliminary investments, options to vary production levels,
options to wait and learn before making decisions, options to grow,
and options to abandon risky projects. Indeed, any sequential
investment process involves a series of real options. These options
are said to be real options to distinguish them from the financial
options, such as stock options, discussed above in Part I. When
describing a general investment situation, the phrase "real options"
suggests that not only is the option perspective applicable, but also
that it should be used, in analyzing the sequential choices that are
inherent in investment opportunities. Several recent books and
articles focus on the power of applying the option perspective to
managerial decisionmaking.4"
Legal scholars have only recently begun to study the implications
of the option perspective for legal rules and institutions.47 Virtually
4 MARTHA AMRAM & NALIN KULATILAKA, REAL OPTIONS: MANAGING STRATEGIC
INVESTMENTINANUNCERTAINWORLD (1999); Martha Amram & Nalin Kulatilaka, Disciplined
Decisions: Aligning Strategy with the Financial Markets, HARV. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1999,
at 95. For additional references about real options, many of which are available as links from
<http://www.real-options.com/>, see LENOS TRIGEORGIS, REAL OPTIONS: MANAGERIAL
FLEXIBILITYAND STRATEGYIN RESOURCEALLOCATIONS (1996); Thomas E. Copeland & Philip
T. Keenan, How Much is Flexibility Worth?, 2 MOKINSEY Q. 38 (1998); Thomas E. Copeland
& Philip T. Keenan, MakingReal Options Real, 3 MCKINSEY Q. 128 (1998); Robert C. Merton,
Applications of Option-Pricing Theory: Twenty-Five Years Later (Nobel PrizeAddress), 88 AM.
ECON. REV. 323 (1998); Peter Coy, Exploiting Uncertainty: The 'Real Options'Revolution in
Decision-making, BUS. WE., June 7, 1999, at 118; Peter Coy, Options, Options, Everywhere,
Bus. WE., June 7, 1999, at 124; Avinash K. Dixit & Robert Pindyck, The Options Approach
to Capital Investment, HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 105; Nalin Kulatilaka & N.
Venkatraman, Real Options in the Digital Economy, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 1999, at 26; Timothy
A. Luehrman, Investment Opportunities as Real Options: Getting Started on the Numbers,
HARV. BUS. REV., July-Aug. 1998, at 51; Strategy as a Portfolio of Real Options, HARV. Bus.
REV., Sept.-Oct., 1998, at 89; S. L. Mintz, Getting Real, CFO MAG., Nov. 1999, at 52; Jim
Smith, Much Ado About Options?, 18 INFORMS 4 (1999); Thor Valdmanis, Corporate
Executives Examine Strategic Took A New Way to Assess Risk Arrives, USA TODAY, May 12,
1999, at B5.
"' See, e.g., Ian Ayres & J.M. Balkin, Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Beyond, 106 YALE L.J. 703, 704 n.4 (1996) (citing and discussing recent
articles that have recharacterized the difference between liability rules and property rules
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every legal actor encounters risk in making decisions. Not only
transactional and tax attorneys, but also elected officials, judges,
legislators, litigators, negotiators, and regulators face numerous
types of risks, including those arising from contractual, financial,
appellate, regulatory, statutory, tax, and technological sources. It
is increasingly important for these legal decisionmakers to respond
effectively to such risks. There are four traditional ways of
managing risk: insurance, diversification, acquiring information,
and trading in debt and equity. A recent additional way of handling
risk involves investing in financial and real options. While financial
and real options differ, the common idea underlying both is that
risks involve not only dangers, but also opportunities. This is
because an option provides the flexibility not'to be locked into an
irreversible course of action. Both financial and real options allow
those facing risky environments to profit from the upside potential
while truncating losses from the downside possibility of the risks
they face. This is because financial and real options allow legal
actors to make future decisions after learning some relevant
information.
The basic course in Corporations provides an opportunity to use
economics as an organizing principle to teach and compare law
cases, as well as an opportunity to use law cases to illustrate and
teach economic principles. Similarly, the basic course in Corpora-
tions provides an opportunity to apply the financial option perspec-
tive to view corporate securities as financial options as well as to use
corporate transactions to illustrate real corporate options. The
hostile takeovers, mergers, and other corporate transactions that
are the subject matter of corporate law all involve real options. The
in terms of different option strike prices); Bradford Cornell, The Incentive to Sue: An Option-
Pricing Approach, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 173 (1990) (proposing to analyze litigation investments
as options); Peter H. Huang, A New Options Theory for Risk Multipliers of Attorneys'Fees in
Federal CivilRights Litigation, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1943 (1998) (applying the option perspective
to calculate risk multipliers for attorney's fees); Paul G. Mahoney, Contract Remedies and
Option Pricing, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1995) (viewing contractual breaches as options);
Michael S. Knoll, Put-Call Parity and the Development of the Modern Mortgage (1994)
(U.S.C. Law Center Working Paper No. 94-12) (viewing mortgages as options); Joseph A.
Grundfest & Peter H. Huang, Real Options and the Economic Analysis of Litigation: A
Preliminary Inquiry (1996) (Working Paper No. 131, John M. Olin Program in Law and
Economics, Stanford Law School) (providing a general real options analysis of litigation).
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standard way of approaching these risky corporate transactions is
to compute their expected value, defined to be the weighted average
of the possible outcomes, with the weights being their probabilities
of actually occurring. For example, the notion of when information
regarding speculative corporate transactions is material is phrased
in terms of a probability-magnitude test.48 Such an expected-value
approach to speculative corporate transactions implicitly assumes
that corporate actors are locked into those corporate transactions
without any real options to exit, vary, scale, learn, or abandon
investments. Once those real corporate options are recognized, a
speculative corporate transaction has a real option value different
from and greater than merely its expected value.
Indeed, there are many real options in law outside the corporate
area. For example, litigants can decide whether to drop, settle, or
continue a lawsuit after they learn material facts during discovery.
Thus, any lawsuit involves a sequence of real options to continue or
settle that lawsuit. By filing a lawsuit, a plaintiff acquires a series
of continuation or settlement options that a defendant has involun-
tarily written. The defendant also has a package of settlement
options. All of the premia for these options are paid to lawyers and
the court system rather than to the defendant and plaintiff.
Other examples of real options in the law are the option that a
law firm has to hire more entry-level associates versus making
lateral hires, and the option that a law firm has to build on a
property now versus delaying construction until the future.
Examples of real options that law students are familiar with
include:
" options that third-year law students have to
accept permanent job offers after being summer
associates;
" options that financially distressed parties have to
declare corporate or personal bankruptcies;
Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,238 (1988) (quoting SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968)).
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• options that monopolists have to deter entry by
engaging in predatory innovation, leveraging
monopoly power, or predatory pricing;49
• options that corporate raiders have to make
hostile takeover bids;
• options that contracting parties have to breach
contracts and pay damages;
" options that governments have to claim proper-
ties by eminent domain and pay just compensa-
tion; and
• options that property owners have to develop
environmental resources later instead of sooner.
An early introduction to the option perspective in legal education
allows law students to appreciate that a diverse set of legal
doctrinal areas, including antitrust, bankruptcy, civil and criminal
procedure, corporations, environmental regulation, jurisprudence,
property, securities, and tax all involve the acquisition or granting
of often hidden options. Examples of the breadth and scope of
applying the real option perspective to law include realizing that
corporate appraisal rights are real options, viewing civil procedure
as regulating litigation options embedded in lawsuits, and charac-
terizing the preservation of ecosystems and endangered species as
real options.
III. CONCLUSION
This Essay advocates introducing the option perspective into the
teaching of the basic corporate law course. Although stock options
arise naturally in several corporate law cases, there are many
benefits to considering them in a more detailed and organized
fashion than merely discussing particular cases. This Essay
describes five of these benefits. First, defining stock options right
after defining stocks differentiates the price change aspect of stock
9 Peter H. Huang, Still Preying on Strategic Reputation Models of Predation: A Review
of John R. Lott, Jr., Are Predatory Commitments Credible? Who Should the Courts Believe?
(forthcoming 2000).
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ownership from other aspects of stock ownership, such as receiving
dividends and having voting rights. Second, displaying stock option
payoffs visually helps students see the zero-sum nature of trading
in options, understand how to perform financial engineering by
vertically adding such graphs, and convince themselves pictorially
of the put-call parity relationship. Third, the option perspective
allows the conflict of incentives between shareholders and bondhold-
ers of a corporation to be portrayed in terms of options on corporate
assets. Fourth, the option perspective explains why paying
managers in stock and/or stock options mitigates the conflict of
interests between managers and shareholders in terms of increasing
managers' willingness to undertake risky projects. Fifth, introduc-
ing the concept of real options as opposed to financial options
permits law students to appreciate the difference between tradi-
tional expected values and real option values not only for corporate
projects, but also in many non-corporate areas of law.

